from THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, volume 4, number 2, June 1981

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Strategic Non-Violent Defense:
The Construct of an Option

Gene Keyes*

If a nation disarms, can it wage strategic non-violent defense against a ruthless foe? There is no complete precedent, but Denmark's struggle against Nazi German occupation 1940-1945 is one of the nearest tactical facsimiles. When Hitler's bombers swept over Copenhagen on 9 April, 1940, their menacing leaflets specifically warned against 'passive resistance':

… it is expected that … the people and all municipalities will evidence their good will by avoiding either passive or active resistance. Such resistance will be useless and will be broken by all means in our power … # 3

It was not useless; it was not broken. The Danish success in holding the Nazis at bay refutes critics who say that against Hitler or Stalin non-violent action 'obviously fails'. # 4 However, this paper cites Denmark only in passing. Its main purpose is to present a construct for non-violent defense, both as a step toward a general strategic doctrine of unarmed resistance in future situations, and as a contrast for 'primitive' tactical examples in the past. From the construct in turn the paper proposes a theory centering on the respective morale of a defending Polity, and an invading Foe-Polity. Meanwhile, this assertion is the keynote: The fast track to failure in non-violent defense is to use tactics without strategy, strategy without principle, and principle without tenacity. The slow track to success is more problematic.

* This paper is adapted from my 1978 doctoral dissertation at York University, Toronto, entitled Strategic Nonviolent Defense in Theory; Denmark in Practice. Aid and discomfort were provided by David V. J. Bell (chairman), Roddick Byers, and Theodore Olson. John Gellner, Edgar Dosman, and Mulford Q. Sibley were helpful at other stages of the committee process as were my parents, Scott and Charlotte Keyes. With thanks, I absolve them all on any question of style or substance herein.

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The idea of non-violent national defense was suggested as far back as 1852 by Elihu Burritt (USA, 1810-1879), # 5 and in 1915 by Bertrand Russell (UK, 1872-1970). # 6 The idea reappeared in 1931 as a minor corollary to the work of M. K. Gandhi (India, 1869-1948) , # 7 and a few pacifist thinkers, notably A. J. Muste (USA, 1895-1967), # 8 and Cecil Hinshaw (USA). # 9

Then in 1957, Sir Stephen King-Hall (UK. 1893-1966) — retired naval commander, former MP, and political-military commentator — brought the notion of non-violent defense into the realm of strategic debate by urging it upon the UK, NATO, and the US, in lieu of nuclear weapons. # 10 Despite many refinements by more recent writers, the strategy of non-violent defense — also called civil resistance, civilian-based defense, non-violent common defense, etc. — remains in escrow. Along with non-violent action in general, it is often dismissed as merely a local technique for democratic environments and 'civilized' opponents.

Since the late 1950s, Gene Sharp (USA) has attacked this cliché, and theorized in detail about the dynamics and methods of non-violent action for dismembering totalitarian power structures. # 11 With knowledge and preparation, civilian resistance could be made a prudent defense in depth against imposition of alien government. Other analysts who have advanced the study of civilian non-violent resistance to aggression include Adam Roberts (UK), # 12 Theodor Ebert (FRG), # 13 lohan Galtung (Norway), # 14 plus Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack (Denmark/UK). # 15

Prior to them, # 16 the confluence of pacifist and Gandhian thinking had gradually generated a moral case for non-violent defense. # 17 Yet except for occasional hints, pamphlets, and exhortations, it had not really buttressed the idea with any detailed study of precedents, problems, or prospects. A new chapter began in April 1957. King-Hall was aghast that the White Paper on defense had explicitly renounced any defense of the British Isles, confirming that all its eggs and all Britons were in the nuclear retaliation basket.

At this point, King-Hall re-emphasized the political nature of the struggle with the Communist world. He called for a Royal Commission study on the potentiality of a civilian non-violent defense posture for Britain (with its allies if possible), and the abandonment of all its nuclear weapons as useless, along with most of its conventional forces. His proposal first appeared in his own weekly newsletter, and later as a lecture at the Royal United Service Institution in October 1957. # 18 His book Defence in the Nuclear Age was published in March 1958 in England where it stirred up a lively flurry of reviews, but was unable to break what King-Hall called the 'thought barrier'. # 19

In this same period, Henry Kissinger gained fame for discerning the 'nuances' of 'limited nuclear war'. # 20 Morton Kaplan pressed the admittedly 'bizarre' idea of 'limited nuclear retaliation', # 21 And Herman Kahn's celebrated lectures on thermonuclear war urged people to 'think about the unthinkable'. # 22 Yet for King-Hall to scorn nuclear weapons altogether in favor of non-violent defense was a little too unthinkable. Nowadays one searches almost in vain through the bookshelves of orthodox strategy for any mention whatsoever of

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King-HaIl's attempt to open up an alternative defense method for discussion. And even some of the most caustic opponents of nuclear strategy have themselves not troubled to explore the path King-Hall indicated of a remobilization for non-violent defense.

Such critiques as those by Anatol Rapoport, or Philip Green, are well-taken, but beg the question: if not nuclear deterrence, what? # 23 Given Kaplan's apologia for nuclear assault (along with his conventional trigger-happiness), # 24 and Green's trenchant puncturing of deterrence presumptions, one might think that if they debated 'strategic thinking and its moral implications', I would naturally favor Green. Yes and no. I found Kaplan voicing a value judgement which is basic to this paper:

I am not really in disagreement that there is something immoral in holding the threat of death over someone else to produce a political result. Even though I agree in principle that every life is infinitely valuable, psychologically I find the idea of mass destruction of human beings particularly horrible. # 25

Green voices an assumption which is likewise basic herein:

Enemies or at least opponents always exist in political affairs — that is a condition the reality of which should be denied by no one. # 26

But I was startled at Green's deplorable abdication of responsibility:

[Social scientists] should give no policy advice, but should rather point out, publicly, the shortcomings of policies …  # 27

The other fatal weakness in Green's argument is its toleration of minimum deterrence. Jimmy Carter's rhetorical wish for 'zero nuclear weapons' is more acceptable, and should be a nation's operative policy as a function of the 'readiness for defense by the whole society' which S. L. A. Marshall spoke of in another context.# 28 It is the non-violent national defense option which is largely overlooked by orthodox strategic analysts.

Times do change, though. In 1964, Alastair Buchan wrote the introduction to Civilian Defence, the first 'strategic' pamphlet of its kind after King-HalI. # 29 In 1967, B. H. Liddell Hart and Thomas G. Schelling each contributed hedging but positive articles to The Strategy of Civilian Defence, the first book of its kind after King-Hall. # 30 In 1973, Gene Sharp's magnum opus The Politics of Nonviolent Action was published. with an introduction by Schelling; it has been favorably reviewed by military journals among others. # 3l In 1976, Brigadier General Edward B. Atkeson published a somewhat negative analysis of 'civilian-based defense' in the Military Review. # 32 And in the December 1977 American Political Science Review, Glenn Paige criticized his own 1968 book, The Korean Decision, for failing to take into account non-violent policy alternatives; he mentioned that

An extraordinarily versatile combination of political, economic, social, cultural, and communications means might be employed to prevent, resist, limit, and defuse armed aggression … # 33

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Such nods to non-violent defense are quite the exception, and the exponents themselves are largely a part-time group: who wants to subsidize their research? In America as in Canada; in England as in Denmark: the interest remains almost nil. Undaunted, Gene Sharp has been the dean of the defenders by virtue of relentless scholarship. His formidable book elaborates 198 distinct methods of non-violent action, as well as the step-by-step dynamics involved. # 34 Its central focus is the 'voluntary servitude' concept of political power, first suggested in 1550 by the young French philosopher Etienne de la Boetie (1530-1563). # 35 Sharp's theorem is that political power rests on obedience, that obedience is not inevitable, and that the strategic task of sustained non-violent action is to deprive would-be or actual dictatorships of the consent which makes them possible.


The construct

Non-violent defense analysts such as Sharp have had the same problem as their nuclear counterparts: no full-blown precedent exists for either planned, controlled H-bomb war or planned, controlled non-violent defense. To date there has never been a feedback situation where an endangered polity has seized upon a body of tradition and doctrine and non-violent strategy to adapt for its own conditions, while producing improvements in doctrine for its own or another conflict. Czechoslovakians in 1968 may have come closer to that stage than any of their forebears; but, as in all comparable cases, improvisation was the prime reality.

Every historic instance of 'non-violent defense' (so-called by me or others) has been a social re-invention; an embryonic flutter compared to centuries of militaristic know-how. # 36 For the invaded community, there was little or no theory to speak of; only a need to do something, somehow. An aroused populace that could not readily find guns began defying the aggressor by other means. Without doctrine, planning, and strategy, the efforts were bound to be worn down by the aggressor, and/or upstaged by more explosive forms of resistance.

Still, attempts were made, and noted. But in most of the writing on nonviolence and civilian resistance, such cases have been treated cursorily, or as relatively unstructured narratives. If non-violent defense theory is to become more reinforced by realities, it is important that parallel case studies be made of these various efforts, such as that of Denmark. It is to this end that the following 'construct' is offered. It tries to accomodate alike fortuitous past occurrences and calculated future exigencies of non-violent defense. It tries to be an isomorphic pattern for viewing military threats, in widely varied circumstances, yesterday or tomorrow. And by its very slant, its first-things-first predisposition, it imparts an order of thinking about world politics and strategy in general.

It is a measure rather than a model; a construct rather than a theory. It can be used to describe or evaluate a past or future situation; not to explain or predict one. It is a diagram, a sorting out of the subjects and predicates and priorities of non-violent defense (or any other kind): exactly who does what to

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NON-VIOLENT COMMON DEFENSE: THE CONSTRUCT OF A STRATEGY

Thus, the construct has three sectors: Polity, Foe-Polity, and Strategy. Each can be viewed through the same diffraction grating, a '6-P ' mnemonic. Its categories are indented that way to accentuate the primacy of Principles in the construct for all three sectors. Particulars and Parties are conceptually subordinate, but must precede and incarnate the argument. Likewise, Purposes, Policies. and Programs are successively subordinate. # 37 Yet they are so semi-autonomous in political affairs as to warrant separate enumeration.

Definitions:

A Polity will tend to be a nation-state, but could also be a city-state, a non-state nation. a region, an alliance, the UN, a world government, or the like.

A Foe-Polity is any of the above, and one that threatens, invades, oroccupies another Polity.

Strategy has been well-defined by J. C. Wylie as 'a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment'. # 38

In the construct, we assume that the Strategy of non-violent common defense is one among the unarmed policies employed — perhaps unwittingly, preferably with diligence — by an endangered Polity to ward off the armed embrace of a Foe-Polity. As for the '6-P ' set:

Particulars specify what and where and when: the situation, the locale, the context.

The word Parties will be used not only in its political, but also its legal, social, and personal sense. It will include discussion of the protagonists, organizations, and personalities of a given contest.

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(In this hierarchy, 'aim' could be synonymous with objective. 'Ends' could be synonymous with goals, but I would rather not use the former because there are really never any ends to anything, only new beginnings.) # 39

A definition for Policies is essentially the same as that quoted above for Strategy, except that the latter has military connotations; the former, civilian. The two are braided together in the construct in the sense that among the policies chosen by a Polity can be the Strategy of non-violent common defense. This Strategy in turn carries a number of alternate policy possibilities.

Finally, Programs are the detailed implementation on a day to day or year to year basis of a given policy: what tactics are to strategy.

Were non-violent defense a Polity's considered Strategy, the programs and tactics would be carefully calculated. But when — as always, so far — we find merely adventitious passive resistance in lieu of strategic non-violent defense, there is no 'program' as such. A case history must dub one in. # 40 The same events could just as well be labeled 'improvisation' or 'narrative'. However, 'program' is the term used here, because the construct is bi-directional, looking forward as well as backward. It will consolidate the chance circumstances of a case into the semblance of a 'program', the better to notice conditions and details which a real program would have to take into account. Like any animal, vegetable, or weapon, non-violent defense must be bred into existence from very primitive ancestors.

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Military strategists often seem more aware of purpose as such than their civilian leaders and counterparts. Thus, John M. Collins, Director of Military Strategy Studies at the US National War College, opened his 1973 book by saying 'A clear sense of purpose must underlie all meaningful plans. programs, and actions. That is an elemental idea, but it is often unappreciated or ignored.' # 43 Collins further noted that 'no interests or objectives were formally recorded by the Executive Branch during either the Kennedy or Johnson administrations.' # 44 He then mentioned what seems to me an astonishing state of affairs: 'Critical U.S. national security interests and objectives are still not identified … in unclassified print, but … can be deduced rather easily … ' # 45 So, when Brigadier General Edward B. Atkeson, Deputy Commandant of the US Army War College, essayed a critique in 1976 of non-violent defense theory, he first had to posit his own list of 'US security interests', because 'nowhere in official government literature does a comprehensive and succinct statement of US security interests exist'. # 46 Non-violent common defense, on the contrary, would certainly entail open purposes openly arrived at, with a decent respect for human rights and for the opinions of humankind.

As will be shown, the purposes of a Polity and its Strategy must differ. Meanwhile, for the sake of argument, I would like to moot three idealized goals for any contemporary Polity, in seven words apiece:

'National integrity' is what I want to emphasize here. I have not named 'survival' as an overriding goal, as would Nicolas Spykman or Henry Kissinger or John M. Collins or the Institute for Strategic Studies, to take just a few. There are a number of reasons for not doing so.

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majority always submits and adopts servile manners to preserve its existence … It is the weak majority which needs protection )' # 87

This is the poser Liddell Hart raised even earlier (p. 133 above). And this is the poser implied by Ivo D. Duchacek's mordant observation about post-1968 Czechoslovakia:

The all-permeating party control over jobs and privileges — and therefore over life itself — is based on a devastatingly simple assumption that among mortal men, on the whole, heroes and martyrs have always been less numerous than bons vivants — especially in the proximity of the Soviet superpower. # 88

In other words. we are faced with an inexorable bell-shaped curve for an occupied populace which might show 5 per cent heroism, 90 per cent disgruntled adjustment, and 5 per cent treason (worse yet, 2-96-2, or 1-98-1). We have an explicit fear that a non-violent defense policy can be cracked, not so much by the bang of a firing squad as by the whimper of a self-seeking public. (If this fear is correct, then nuclear weapons are the supreme symbol of national cowardice, a polity's supreme confession of non-confidence in itself and its citizenry.)

Yet as far as non-violent defense strategy need be concerned, that bell-shaped curve is merely one of the givens, one of the particulars, an environmental constraint: an immensely difficult constraint, but not prohibitively so. Thus it will be the task of non-violent defense analysts to estimate and allow for the degree of public pliability vis-a-vis an invader, as well as to factor in the allowable limits of compliance, semi-resistance, and indirect resistance. All of these will compose the bulk of the common defense, the 'inert ingredients' of the medicine. As well, the non-violent defense planners will also prescribe the more exciting dosages of direct resistance, which will be a much smaller percentage, but the 'active ingredients' of the medicine. (A familiar compound in guerrilla warfare.) The important thing will be to 'shake well', because direct and indirect resistance should not become too separated. Average citizens should not be shamed for making only indirect gestures (e.g., alsangs), nor should they fail to be challenged to go all out at critical moments (as in the Copenhagen General Strike).


Strategic non-violent defense in theory

Pity the theory which sets itself in opposition to mental and moral forces!

    — Clausewitz, 1827 # 89

Apart from certain variants and new details for policies and programs, does the construct yield a theory of strategic non-violent defense when it screens the Danish resistance — a theory not bound by the peculiarities of the Danish case, nor limited to reiterating the 6-P's?

Emerging from the parallax of the construct, and the Danish case history, the factor of morale jumps to a higher prominence than it had in either by

itself. Despite my earlier emphasis on morale as the center of gravity for the Polity and Foe- Polity alike, I had perhaps not sufficiently heralded the significance of that concept - at least not to the extent this paper is now stressing as a critical realignment of strategic non-violent defense theory.

Wylie calls the choice and control of the center of gravity 'the fundamental key to the conduct of warfare'. # 90 And I had already raised the argument of morale forming that center of gravity. I hereby raise the same argument, to another power. Morale at the center of gravity will be the theory adumbrated by the construct, not just an adjunct to it.

We are not discussing morale itself; only its place in strategic non-violent defense theory. Of course, 'morale' is just the verbal tip of an iceberg. Let S. L, A. Marshall's definition be indicative; and as before, let his additional remarks be broadened from 'army' to 'society'. He calls morale '"the body of thought of a person or persons as to whether it disposes the thinker to high endeavor or toward failure"' and goes on to say:

Morale is the thinking of an army. It is the whole complex body of an army's thought: The way it feels about the soil and the people from which it springs. The way it feels about their cause and their politics as compared with other causes and other politics. The way it feels about its friends and allies, as well as its enemies. About its commanders and goldbricks. About food and shelter. Duty and leisure. Payday and sex. Militarism and civilianism. Freedom and slavery. Work and want. Weapons and comradeship. Bunk fatigue and drill. Discipline and disorder. Life and death. God and the devil. # 91

I will try to encapsulate below a modified theory of strategic non-violent defense. In its immediate formulation, it is patterned, not after Sharp, Roberts, or Ebert, but after Boserup and Mack, and J. C. Wylie; ultimately after Clausewitz. # 92

Thus, according to Boserup and Mack, a strategic theory must be descriptive, suggesting the '"laws of motion" of war'; and prescriptive, enabling a strategist to overview an entire struggle, choose and control its center of gravity, and evaluate tactics only according to their usefulness in maintaining one's own center of gravity while undoing the foe's. # 93 This is essentially the same course laid by Rear Admiral Wylie:

a general theory of strategy should be some development of the following fundamental theme: The primary aim of the strategist in the conduct of war is some selected degree of control of the enemy for the strategist's own purpose; this is achieved by control of the pattern of the war; and this control of the pattern of war is had by manipulation of the center of gravity of war to the advantage of the strategist and the disadvantage of the opponent. # 94

So, a modified theory of strategic non-violent defense — descriptive, prescriptive, predictive — is offered as follows:

In war the center of gravity is morale; the side which loses it first loses

the war. A defending polity whose strategy is non-violent common defense must ensure that its morale is strong to begin with and essentiially unshaken in the course of a struggle against an invading foe-polity whose aim perforce is to subdue the defenders' morale. All tactics must relate first to preserving the polity's own morale; and then to reducing the foe-polity's morale, sufficient for the eventual departure of the foe-polity.

This morale-centric theory ought to be applicable to a wide variety of cases, non-violent or otherwise. Vietnam and Iran were noted above. And, to cite one other. example, Finland: militarily, it lost the Winter War against Russia by March 1940, but was able to sue for peace with morale unshattered, and keep its democratic government, despite Stalin's earlier onslaught, complete with puppet-government-in-waiting. # 95 Technically, Russia could have annexed Finland in 1940, but among other factors, Stalin knew that the Finns had not been demoralized, whereas the Red Army and the Soviet Union had been during their inept aggression. As Max Jakobson said, 'Finland was defeated. But she was not conquered.' # 96

The theory can also readily accomodate the existing literature on non-violent defense. For one thing, to locate morale in the zenith of strategic non-violent defense doctrine is scarcely a new suggestion. Gregg. and King-Hall, respectively, had just about said as much in 1934 and 1957. # 97 Furthermore, demoralization of a foe is widely discussed in the literature. Yet a polity's own morale, though by no means lacking consideration, is rather more implicit by comparison; more subsidiary in tone; more in the category of 'yes, we need that too'. However, at the center of gravity, morale becomes the sine qua non of strategic non-violent defense.

For another thing, morale has at its own nucleus a moral argument, which is where Gandhian strategic non-violence began in the first place. It is in the concept of morale that the pragmatic and the moral interpretations of non-violent defense converge and co-exist; where the militarist Clausewitz and the pacifist Burritt stand shoulder to shoulder.

(The linkage of morale and morality is a theme I have developed in draft manuscripts, but not the present work. That I do not overestimate the moral component, however, is indicated by my choice of the Marshall definition. Meanwhile, the 'basic value judgment' inhering strategic non-violent defense was stated in the passage by Morton Kaplan. Nonetheless, Kaplan and most orthodox strategists — and some latter-day non-violent strategists — have tried to tiptoe past the moral argument with only a pro-forma recognition. J. C. Wylie called 'strategic morality' an 'incidental stumbling block'. # 98 My theory hypothesizes, per contra, that morale — with its moral nucleus — is not just an 'incidental stumbling block', but the very grounds of the defense effort, as well as the reef on which a foe-polity goes aground.)

If this theory re-orients the literature somewhat, does it modify the construct whence it came? Though it does not supplant principles as the pith and pinnacle of the construct, morale may be regarded as the sum and substance of the principles and the purposes, the policies and the programs: of the Polity; of the Strategy. All of which could be used to equate morale with two other words: grand strategy.

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Now, as I am going to die, I wonder if I have been able to ignite a small flame in someone, a flame which will outlive me, and yet I am calm in the knowledge that nature is rich … the dream for you all, young and old, must be to create an ideal of human decency … That is the great gift our country hungers for …

     — Kim Malthe-Brunn, 21, a day before he was executed by the Gestapo on 5 April, 1945.  # 101

I would like to return to the preconception with which this paper began: that the fast track to failure in non-violent defense is to use tactics without strategy, strategy without principle, and principle without tenacity.

Non-violent tactics there were aplenty in Denmark. Of strategy there was little or none, simply because the concept did not exist, except for King-Hall's bright idea in 1938; Gandhi's exhortations; a few other inklings. Principle was Denmark's strongest suit: democratic principle and a strong trait of moderation, in lieu of Gandhian non-violence. Tenacity is to be found in ample measure among the various Danish leadership groupings. So Denmark was well endowed with at least three of the four considerations above, as well as the national integrity and invincible morale which are the foundations of strategic non-violent defense. In this imperfect world, Denmark waged an imperfect yet exemplary kamp uden vaaben (war without weapons); at the same time cooperating perhaps more than necessary with German bloodsuckers and British firebrands alike.

But Denmark adds two more desiderata to our listing: laughter; and decency. As for the former, Ebbe Neergaard wrote that Nazi ideology had made little headway, partly due to the Danes' 'peaceable sarcastic mentality, entirely unimpressed by anything pompous'. # 102 Poul Nørlund said that 'The German chains were broken by Danish laughter' . # 103 And as for the latter (with apologies to General MacArthur): there is no substitute for decency. In Denmark, common ordinary decency became the stuff of non-violent common defense.


A postscript and a parting shot: strategic studies and strategic non-violent defense

Murphy's Law, # 104 ipse dixit, should be the definitive warning against any strategy involving the mere possession of nuclear weapons, much less their use. But this bit of lore has yet to be fully appreciated by orthodox defense analysts. In a 1975 conventional-wisdom introduction to strategic studies, John Baylis makes the dubious confession that his group believes 'with luck and good judgement, military power can be effectively managed … ' # 105 Luck and good judgement are two volatile commodities which it is highly irresponsible to count on indefinitely in a nuclear-armed world. # 106 Baylis concedes it is 'optimistic' to hold such an opinion, and consoles himself only by presuming it more optimistic 'to believe that, by sustained effort, the capacity for organized

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violence can be abolished'. # 107 Thus, as in virtually all other books of that type, there is not the slightest mention of King-Hall and his pioneering effort to break the thought barrier, to make non-violent defense a realistic substitute for nuclear roulette.

One need not be optimistic, and I am not, about the prospects for abolishing reliance on organized violence. But that is no excuse to shrink from the attempt; no excuse to shirk the intellectual effort required to explore the problems and possibilities of strategic non-violent defense; and no excuse to count fatalistically on 'luck' to vindicate nuclear strategy of any stripe. Nuclear deterrence will succeed — Baylis, et aI., will be right — 5 times out of 6, perhaps even 5,999 out of 6,000. And then?

Meanwhile, as noted, non-violent defense analysis receives at best a wink and a nod from mainstream strategic writers. It has also been something of a foster child in the fairly new field of peace research. Even here it gets lost in the shuffle, given the over-inclusiveness which plagues this discipline. But is non-violent common defense really a peace study? Or a strategic study? Or both? Or what? Two comments by Adam Roberts are apposite. He cautioned peace researchers that

It is obvious that to propose a policy of civilian defense is to advocate a form of conflict — and one which can be both unpleasant and costly. It is therefore not a peace proposal except in the very broad sense. . . # 108

Yet under the aegis of the Swedish Defense Research Institute he likewise cautioned:

Unless there is a clear theoretical conception of the role of civil resistance, it will all too easily be regarded as a mere adjunct of military defence: as something which can be thrown in for good measure on top of existing military preparations. # 109

Finally, we note that Boserup and Mack insist they have already demonstrated non-violent defense to be 'a strategy in the classical, Clausewitzian sense'. # 110 As they see it, the strategy 'may run into any number of problems of actual implementation … but theoretically it belongs on a par with all other Clausewitzian strategies'". # 111

In other words, non-violent common defense belongs to strategic studies, but the paternity suit is still pending.

NOTES

1. ^	S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York: Morrow, 1947; Apollo, 1961 ed.), 20.
2. ^	B. H. Liddell Hart, 'Lessons from Resistance Movements — Guerilla and Non-violent', in Adam Roberts, ed., Civilian Resistance as a National Defense: Non-violent Action Against Aggression (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1968), 210. Rev. ed. of paper given at Oxford Civilian Defence Study Conference, Sept. 1964.
3. ^	Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1944). 377.
4. ^	Manus I. Midlarsky, [Review of War Without Weapons: Non-violence in National Defense by Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack], American Political Science Review 81/4 (Dec. 1977) 1739.

 

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