NONVIOLENT MILITARY FORCES may seem a preposterous contradiction in terms, but there are, in the U.S. military, components with such mottoes as: "Alone, Unarmed, Unafraid" (reconnaissance pilots); "That Others May Live" (air rescue); and "Strive to Save Lives" (medevac).

Decades ago, Major General Rondon founded the Brazilian Indian Protection Service and gave it the motto: "Die if You Must but Never Kill."

The 1948-49 Berlin Airlift is perhaps the most famous "unviolent" major campaign carried out by a military force.

Mao Zedong emphasized that "weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that counts." Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall discovered that in World War II, 75 percent of infantry soldiers in combat did not fire their weapons. Whereupon he wrote:

Any fighting man . . . is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his weapons secondarily. Having to make a choice in the face of the enemy, he would rather be unarmed with comrades around him than altogether alone, though possessing the most perfect of quick-firing weapons.

To be sure, these notes are taken out of context. But they hint at an esprit de corps for a hypothetical military service that spurns all weapons but one: courage.

A working definition of "Unarmed Services" will be: Men and women effective forming an entire military command without weapons; well-equipped for mobility and logistics; trained to accept casualties, never inflict them.

While many assumptions can be found in this article, these three are basic:
1 Killing people is the primary and residual duty of all armed forces.
2 There is conflict everywhere, often tending toward military "solutions."
3 All existing and would-be states have armed forces.

Likewise, I could state various premises, but here is the operative one: "Thou shalt not kill." Ever. Pacifism? Perhaps. But the key distinction emphasized herein is not between war and peace, but between killing and dying.
Let us postulate "disarmies" that could provoke a war as well as prevent one, that could go to war as well as stop one. In all cases, the essential duty of these unarmed services would be: ever to give life, never to take it.

To imagine unarmed services across the board, consider three broad questions: What can they do? Whose are they? What do they defend?

Our main focus will be on what they can do — the military mission. However, we should also bear in mind that any armed (or unarmed) force is established by a political parent and guided by a moral mandate. The nominal purpose of any military force is national defense, but of course that's not the whole story. So we consider a wide range of missions through peace, conflict, and war.

There are hundreds of political/military possibilities. The United Nations is a logical birthplace for unarmed forces, but just for the sake of argument, we could depict them established by Costa Rica or Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Nordic Council, the U.S. or Yugoslavia, the Irish Republican Army or Mongolia, Solidarity or Somalia. My intent is to sketch unarmed forces as a general proposition, adaptable anywhere, even to the most unexpected origin.

They would be a social invention, a political instrument in a world still afflicted by deadly power conflicts, occasional genocide, structural violence, natural disasters, ecological trauma, nuclear roulette, and the military habits of a millennium. Unarmed forces might well be acquired as a deliberate initiative, or through unforeseen mutation, by polities that had the vision or nerve or serendipity to do so.

The ideas in this article are grouped according to their military mission: Peace, Conflict, and War. They may be considered in terms of the political parent:

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freeze movement. If a conflict comes up that seems to need an armed force to settle it, he said, advocates of nonviolence should have alternatives to offer. He wants to hear from people who want to help make these ideas happen; write him c/o CoEvolution.

As usual, we did most of our photo research at the University of California Library at Berkeley. Also helpful was the United Nations headquarters in New York, which maintains a large, inexpensively available photo file of nearly everything the U.N. does. For another perspective on the effectiveness (or lack of it) of military organization, see "Doing a Job" by Hyman Rickover (p. 72).
Rescuing civilians: Paramedic Lawrence Davis (facing camera) of the U.S. Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service holds an injured man as the two are hoisted from atop a grain elevator in Washington state to the safety of a rescue helicopter.

"True, the [Aerospace Rescue and Recovery] Service is an arm of the air force, with a primary job of saving the lives of American airmen, but... one [also] finds it is, perhaps more accurately, an international rescue service, ready to render professional help when and where needed, no matter how impossible the task.... In many zones, in fact, the gold-banded ARRS aircraft are the only ones permitted to fly across international borders without prior clearance."

- L.B. Taylor, Jr., That Others May Live (see bibliography); p. 120.

Definition: The employment of military capability for saving lives and setting up disaster relief in times of natural or man-made catastrophe; generally in environments or conditions not manageable by local or civilian resources.

If we can imagine a large-scale military service distinctive both for nonpossession of firearms and dedication to saving lives as its primary mission, the most plausible concept may be Rescue Action. Here we have numerous operational precedents. Consider offhand the 1948-49 Berlin Airlift, or multinational response to earthquakes in Peru (1970), Nicaragua (1972), and Italy (1980). Yet except for Berlin, we are talking about tokenism.

The need for a permanent world-available Rescue Command is self-evident. Each year there are about 30 major natural disasters somewhere on the planet, plus various artificial ones. The inadequacy of international rescue efforts — however intense and laudable they have been — is almost common knowledge. We need only recall such recent deliberate tragedies as Biafra, Bangladesh, and Kampuchea, or, among natural calamities, the Bengal cyclone of 1970 and ongoing African droughts. In each case, there were probably deaths surpassing a million and misery beyond accounting. In each case, the sum total of world rescue and relief activity amounted to but a fraction of what was required. Help was tardy and fragmented.

Instead of well-meaning civilian and military gestures, all of these situations could have been the scene of gigantic militarily coordinated rescue missions — if only political authority had chosen to summon them. Any political authority with ample military means: the UN, or Canada, or the U.S., or the U.S.S.R., or an International Rescue Command.

Precedents: From a military standpoint, rescue operations are standard procedure — in particular for medics, the Coast Guard, or the National Guard, just to take some U.S. examples. Also, the Military Airlift Command (MAC) has been involved in hundreds of humanitarian airlifts: a remarkable record — and a miniscule hint of what an organization like MAC could accomplish were rescue action its primary mission. Nowhere was the tragic under-response of military capability more apparent than after the cataclysmic November 1970 cyclone in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Within three weeks the U.S. had managed to send six helicopters. Six?? Out of an inventory of over
"A New 'Great White Fleet,'" Life magazine's July 27, 1959 cover story, supported the plan for a U.S. fleet of unarmed rescue and hospital ships. At Life support for the plan died two weeks later.

12,000? And having as of then lost another 6000 in Vietnam?

The aforementioned Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service illustrates, in miniature, what would be the ethos of an entire military establishment whose mission is to safeguard life, and not to kill. Whenever I think a wholly nonviolent military service is beyond belief, the ARRS comes to mind, where more than 200 service people have given their lives in the course of duty. The ARRS has, apart from battlefield situations, saved more than 20,000 additional lives.

The irony is that, as with medics, the main concern of ARRS is to "keep the fighting strength." Tactically both are the quintessence of a rescue action force. Strategically both are used to ensure that the killing continues.

Ideas: The concept of a "Great White Fleet" of hospital ships seems to have occurred independently to Dr. William B. Walsh, father of the S.S. HOPE, and to U.S. Navy Commander Frank Manson, as amplified by Life magazine. With unusual fanfare, Life floated the White Fleet in a July 27, 1959, cover story, to the cheers of high level and widespread public support. After two more weeks, Life abandoned ship, and the whole notion sank without a trace, except for the privately financed S.S. HOPE, which served from 1960 till its retirement in 1974.

In the Manson/Life version, there would have been six or seven vessels in the Fleet, including a hospital ship, helicopter carrier, cargo ships, and others. Even if fully implemented, that would have been a trivial effort, compared to existing naval resources. Yet concepts of that type ought to be revived, enlarged, studied, and advocated by researchers and policymakers alike, and you, the reader.

The only other specific proposal I know of for a standing rescue force (likewise from a navy man) was by the late Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall, a British political-military analyst. Abandoning nuclear arms, the United Kingdom would, in King-Hall's vision, initiate or promote a UN "International Rescue Organization" (IRO). The IRO would consist of three airborne brigades of 10,000 men and women each, deployed on three continents and other worldwide bases. Each would have 25 large aircraft and ten other transport planes, three ships (15,000 tons, 30 knots), helicopters, and hovercraft. Recruitment would be from all nations for periods of 5, 10, and 15 years. The force would engage in exercises, goodwill visits, and highly publicized annual maneuvers in different areas of simulated emergencies.

Meanwhile, the burden of world-scale relief and rescue action still falls on a dedicated but utterly deficient medley of civilian agencies, hamstrung by penury and political cross-purposes. Since I first wrote my thesis in 1971, an entire literature has emerged reconfirming these problems in the Sahel famine. Moreover, within a single decade since 1970, we have seen megadeath famine and slaughter in Biafra, Bangladesh, and Kampuchea. Even worse, these catastrophes were winked at, for all practical purposes, by the Big Powers.

Rescue action which military services could do in a grand manner is but a dream where noble gestures must be candles in the dark. Thus, to mention but a few, Abie Nathan of Israel and Carl Von Rosen of Sweden each broke the blockade of Biafra to fly in relief supplies. Russell O'Quinn of America flew food to Biafra and Bangladesh. Indochina's Boat People have been aided by such hospital ships as the French Ile de lumiere and the German Cap Anamur, by World Vision's Sea Sweep, and, for a while, by the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

However, a truly sufficient rescue command, for humanitarian intervention in natural or civil disaster, requires a much greater level of magnitude. It should possess, say, more than 100 large transport planes, more than 1000 helicopters, more than 100,000 personnel, plus the equivalent of a U.S. Navy fleet, plus the relevant number of trucks, jeeps, small marine craft, field hospitals,
tent cities, and prepositioned supply dumps. Etcetera. A trifling ten percent of annual world military expenditures might be a reasonable funding level. (That's $50 billion for rescue action, leaving $450 billion for Armageddon.)

Now for a spot-check of reality. During its 1969 cost overruns, the C-5A airplane was touted in a two-page Lockheed ad in Newsweek, headlined PEOPLE STARVING. SEND HELP (Biafra?). It was said to have impressed President Nixon. But when the C-5A did perform in an operational crunch, it was the 1973 Middle East War arms lift, not the humanitarian emergencies for which it would also be suited. And as I write these lines, Newsweek (March 8, 1982) reports that the U.S. Navy has been budgeted $301 million to reacquire hospital ships — for no Great White Fleet, but for the Rapid Deployment Force.

HOPE is but a memory, as is the remark of the Russian ambassador when he visited the HOPE in 1960: "We could all do this if everybody would disarm." Why wait? A combined international rescue fleet could be an introductory stage in a disarmament process. Better yet, a triservice, transnational rescue command: a goal well within the realm of the possible. Even if there is no San Francisco earthquake or Philippine typhoon next week, there are plenty of permanent disaster areas where the Rescue Command can practice its logistics.

These two 1971 U.N. photos show guerrilla soldiers in FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) doing civic action work during their years of armed struggle against Portugal. An army member plants corn seeds (below); a FRELIMO medic examines a baby suffering from malnutrition (opposite page).

"Military attacks on villages and civic action treatment of their wounded inhabitants are getting in each other's way." —Edward Bernard Glick, Peaceful Conflict (The Nonmilitary Use of the Military); 1967; Out of Print; Stackpole Books; p. 174.

Definition: The use of military forces, especially in less-developed areas, for social service projects such as local construction, farming, public health, transportation, education, communication, conservation, community development, and the like.
Precisely because various concepts of military civic action, the Peace Corps, and so-called "national service" are widely known, I am giving this subject short shrift. Ever since William James' 1910 essay "The Moral Equivalent of War," and even long before, the logical substitute for warring armies has been thought to be "peace armies" for any number of civilian-oriented public works. To an extent that is well and good. But I would rather emphasize the idea of unarmed military forces in their primary mission of safeguarding human life: call it defense.

However, so much (yet so little) has been done in the manner of civic action and civilian voluntary service that it can hardly be overlooked in a discussion of unarmed services. I intend only to put these ideas and precedents in perspective, because all of them are but a slight deviation from the twentieth-century norm of war, destruction, and killing. After all, the Peace Corps is about 400 times smaller than the War Corps. Misuse of civic action has been endemic, what with its shotgun wedding to military suppression. Civic action in Vietnam was a red herring. Civic action by the Polish army was a warm-up for martial law.

The civic action ideal is worth noting, but no war or odious regime can be sanitized by it. Likewise, schemes for national service tend to be decoys for a military draft. I'd have no quarrel with making VISTA - Volunteers in Service to America - a thousand times larger. I have only contempt for so-called national service where prison is the alternative. Shall we lock up our daughters for two years if they don't join the Girl Scouts?

A member of the Civilian Conservation Corps tree army at work on the Lolo National Forest, Montana, in 1938. CCC workers planted more than two billion trees in nine years. They also fought fires, rebuilt fences, and worked on flood and erosion control. From The Tree Army: A Pictorial History of the Civilian Conservation Corps 1933-1942 by Stan Cohen; 1980; $8.20 postpaid from Pictorial Histories Publishing Company, 713 South 3rd Street West, Missoula, MT 59801.

Precedents: We need only mention the Seabees, the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the Peace Corps, the admittedly destructive Army Corps of Engineers, and a host of similar endeavors everywhere: military, quasi-military, and civilian. Several books have adequately covered military civic action including titles by Edward Glick (quoted earlier) and Hugh Hanning (see bibliography).

The CCC (1933-1942) was one of the most widely hailed New Deal measures, but Congress ended it by a narrow vote with the onset of World War II. Somehow, "relief" had been the keynote — not conservation. At its height in 1935 the Corps had 500,000 enrollees, and averaged 300,000 in units of 200 at 1500 camps run by the Army in cooperation with the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and Labor. In 1940 alone, the CCC planted over 2.8 million trees, put up over 3600 buildings in parks, etc., and built over 900 reservoirs, among many other accomplishments.

On a much smaller scale there was a California Youth Conservation Corps, 2000 strong, which lost its funding this year. Its volunteers of both sexes served with much esprit despite their motto "Hard Work, Low Pay, Miserable Conditions."

Ideas: These too could be considered at length, but here only in passing. For instance, an "industrial army" was a nineteenth-century socialist artifice that has never been built, for better or
worse. Strictly speaking, the concept is so altogether rational that it is bedazzling. As Charles Fourier asked in 1822, "How is it that our constructors of utopias have not dared to dream of this one: an assemblage of 500,000 men employed in construction instead of destruction?" Or as Edward Bellamy asked in 1888, why is "the killing of men... a task so much more important than feeding and clothing them, that a trained army should be deemed alone adequate to the former, while the latter was left to a mob?" Fourier, Bellamy, and others set forth elaborate designs in which an industrial army is the central social mechanism. In 1954, Heinz Rollman's book *World Construction* proposed that Congress “establish a Peace Army of at least three million men and women,” draftees, for technical instruction abroad. While not a Peace Corps ancestor, Rollman’s idea is sometimes cited among the earlier indications for such a body. The Peace Corps itself has never exceeded 16,000, and is now down to 5000. Should we not aim for 1,000,000 at the very least?

Instead of simply a footnote to the main work of the military, let civic action be a major mission, unencumbered by ambush and defoliation. Let a vast new CCC enroll every young or unemployed person in the land who so desires. And that’s just for openers. Let civic action be the merest rehearsal for:

**Peace**

**Colossal Action**

Wendy Campbell-Purdie and a two-year-old sapling she planted, probably near Bou Saada in the Atlas Mountains of Algeria. She eventually planted 130,000 trees at Bou Saada.
"We advocate that all standing armies everywhere be used for the work of essential reafforestation... in the countries to which they belong, and that each country... shall provide expeditionary forces to cooperate in the greater tasks of land reclamation in the Sahara and other deserts."


Definition: The employment of military capability, especially logistic, in constructive social enterprises of enormous magnitude, possibly requiring ships in the thousands, aircraft in the tens of thousands, personnel in hundreds of millions, and dollars in the hundreds of billions per year.

On January 26, 1975, the New York Times reported that Algeria had begun a 20-year project to plant a 950-mile tree-belt, up to 15 miles wide, to contain the ever-spreading Sahara. It was to cost $100 million a year and involve up to 100,000 servicemen. The September 19, 1977, Newsweek reported that seven nations along the Southern Sahara had announced a $5 million plan to start a similar barrier in their danger zones.

Fine, though a far cry from May 1976, when Henry Kissinger had proposed a $7.5 billion ten-year plan to "roll back the desert." All of these would be a good start.

Precedents: In 1808 the French visionary Charles Fourier prophesied that the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, and the St. Lawrence Seaway could be built by huge industrial armies of both sexes organized to a bare-thee-well, motivated by love and lust, fun and games. These wonders were all accomplished, if not quite as joyously as Fourier planned. His grandest challenge of all, which he suggested in the same breath, still awaits farsighted political-military leadership: "The conquest of the great Sahara desert... by ten or twenty million workers...[who] will transport earth, cultivate the soil, and plant trees everywhere."7

Fourier, a self-taught geographer, had reiterated the battle plan in 1822. He scaled the army down to a mere four million, who would work six to eight months a year over a 40-year period. Their operations would involve reforesting by stages, so as to restore the water sources, fix the sands, and gradually improve the climate.

A century and a half later the Saharan idea was revived on the same scale (without the other utopian trappings) by the noted British forester Richard St. Barbe Baker, who was the father of the Civilian Conservation Corps. The same approach as Fourier's—water retention and climate change by massive tree planting—was and is at the heart of Baker's concept for making the Sahara livable: not 100% forest, but a terrain newly checkered with fields and orchards in all directions.

Baker has led two Sahara expeditions: the first in 1952-53, a 9000-mile drive, including 2600 miles across the desert itself; and in 1964, a 25,000 mile circumnavigation by land, air, and water.8 In 1954 he sketched a preliminary containment phase: a tree shelter-belt around the transitional zones of the Sahara, half a mile wide for 20,000 miles.9 As mentioned, various nations, including Algeria, Senegal, and Egypt, are attempting their sectors of it.

In 1959 Baker urged that an army of 20 million be deployed along a 20,000-mile front to stop the "relentless march of the Sahara," the number he gave being "equal to the present standing armies of the world today."10 Even then the Sahara was sweeping southward up to 30 miles a year. The immense famines and droughts which have more recently afflicted the Sahel and beyond have lent horrible urgency to his warnings.

A lot of impetus came from Wendy Campbell-Purdie, who met Baker in 1960 and took his idea seriously. She set off in 1964 to begin planting the shelter-belt herself in Morocco, in Tunisia, in Algeria. Till then, Baker had been, literally, a voice in the wilderness, pleading with statesmen and diplomats to declare war on the desert.

By 1976, Campbell-Purdie and her local vanguards had won the first skirmish, at Bou Saada, Algeria, where 130,000 trees became a life-sustaining barrier. Fruit, vegetables, and grain are growing there as a result of her efforts.

Meanwhile, there is no detailed "Baker Plan" that I know of. His 1966 book Sahara Conquest was inspiring but discursive. Campbell-Purdie did offer a six-page "blueprint" in her 1967 book Woman against the Desert (see bibliography). But if we are going to avoid the world catastrophe of famine and desertification—if we are going to attack the Sahara on the scale which Fourier, Baker, and Campbell-Purdie indicate—then it is time for some general-staff and United Nations-level planning on the logistics and theaters involved: the millions of troops, the hundreds of billions of dollars.

Icebergs, desalination, solar energy, ecology, wind-chimney turbines must all be considered: This is war!

Much has been written about "arid zones" and their improvement, but desert-research literature is surprisingly arid for how little it has to say...
In 1952 Richard St. Barbe Baker began a two-year expedition by truck through Northern Africa, gathering evidence that the Sahara had once been forest. Here, at El Golea in central Algeria, St. Barbe Baker examines a fossilized tree found in the open desert.

about reclamation on such a momentous scale. Baker emphasizes the colossal size of the Sahara, and of the armies needed to replant a desert larger than the U.S. or Australia. He estimates nearly four billion people could live in a green Sahara.

Is it technically possible? The Roman army alone had made ten million acres of the Sahara usable, building terraces, walls, and reservoirs. Baker and Campbell-Purdie cite the relatively recent discovery of vast underground freshwater aquifers. Figures on volume and extent vary but are enormous. "We are walking on water," says Campbell-Purdie.11

Not that the Sahara could simply be irrigated by well; the recharge rate must be known and balanced. Rather, the main prospect is that vast tree-plantings raise the water table, lower the temperature, prevent flash-flood runoffs, and generate humidity and rain by transpiration. (This microclimate assumption has been disputed, but the reverse effect cannot be doubted, thanks to overgrazing and reckless deforestation.) Wendy Campbell-Purdie has already proven that crops will grow once the tree-sentries take hold — reversing the usual course of agriculture, which is to slash and burn the trees out.

Thanks; I needed that. Now back to our dream world.

Of course, the Arabian peninsula is a continuation of the Sahara region. Adding it as another sector to Sahara reclamation would make the effort about 20 percent larger. Would not this be a better investment for petrodollars?

Ideas: Elsewhere I have discussed over 30 ideas for colossal action, roughly grouped into proposals for:

1) Global Campaigns (e.g., Buckminster Fuller’s World Game);
2) Regional Development (e.g., Mekong Plan);
3) Urban Construction (e.g., Tetra City — Bucky Fuller again);
4) Energy Systems (e.g., "sea-vaporation" and Qattara Hydro);
5) Cosmic Cooperation (e.g., Gerard K. O’Neill’s L5 space colony).

Students and others ought to research simulate and war-game — or "world-game" — the many aspects of a Sahara conquest. Let us call this Conquest World War IV, so that with this moral equivalent, we may skip World War III.
"Here is a modest proposal for fighting the war in Indochina... How about dropping goods on Southeast Asia, instead of bombs?... A thousand pairs of boots dropped daily for a week is cheaper than a single one-thousand pound bomb. I would further propose that we hunt the enemy and bomb with goods first. Keep the communist soldiers busy opening their packages and meanwhile move swiftly in and dump a load on the villagers..."  


**Definition:** The use or display of nonviolent military force during normal or crisis periods for such purposes as goodwill, deterrence, show of strength, propaganda, hostage deployment, and political, psychological or economic warfare; by means such as goodwill visits, public and joint maneuvers, and the delivery of messages, food, equipment, gifts, or hostages, whether requested or not.

The function of Friendly Persuasion could be an essential military mission for any nation which has chosen a strategic nonviolent defense posture. Political warfare was the term Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall used. Thus, besides nuclear disarmament, King-Hall had already been urging on Britain the twin posts of chief of staff for political warfare (on the Chiefs of Staff Committee), and a cabinet minister for the same. King-Hall viewed political warfare as a greatly neglected aspect of Britain’s defenses; he believed that the Western democracies should have a sense of mission to rival the Communists’. His program entailed a political-psychological-propaganda offensive by the U.K. or the West, amply funded and enthusiastically waged. Such an effort would have many phases; here we only consider the military aspects.

Leaflet bombings and loudspeaker planes are two minor tactics which might be greatly augmented in connection with others. Generating goodwill abroad would be another essential, which rescue action or civic action units would do by their very function. Other units trained (perhaps interchangeably with those two) for unarmed defense might want to amplify the traditional goodwill visits of navy ships by soliciting invitations from friend and foe countries alike. Their purpose would be a show of unarmed strength, an...
ostentatious parading of prowess, demonstratively weaponless: e.g., a visit by a helicopter carrier and unarmed marines.

In any grand design for a nonviolent defense posture there will have to be much attention to the Friendly Persuasion use of unarmed forces and to giving them high visibility. The strong spirit they would demonstrate would counter any false notion that to be unarmed is to be weak and afraid. It would be a friendly caution to any potentially threatening power not to disparage an unarmed nation and assume it lacks the will for defense.

These remarks in effect are subsidiary to a main doctrine of nonviolent defense. It happens that two of the ideas for Friendly Persuasion by unarmed forces are in a somewhat different vein, and both in the form of satire. The precedent cited is yet an entirely different category and environment.

Precedent: The quotation from Philip Roth may sound far out, but General Mariano Candido da Silva Rondon in fact had a similar stock in trade. The career of Rondon (1865-1958) deserves further study; at this writing I have only located a scattering of anecdotes (and two non-English biographies) that suggest a bravery so outstanding it may be the exact prototype for organized nonviolent military defense. He is one of Brazil’s national heroes, after whom the federal territory of Rondonia is named. Rondon’s approaches to the most hostile kind of Indians in the Brazilian wilderness must be labeled Friendly Persuasion, but the lessons could be transposed to Defense, Buffer Action, or other categories, with soldiers at mortal risk to themselves but staunchly unarmed, dying without killing, as happened to scores of Rondon’s men.

Rondon founded the Indian Protection Service (IPS) in 1910, to halt 19th-century atrocities against stone age tribes. The IPS courageously discharged its mission, under the motto “Die if Necessary, but Never Kill.” Their task was to win over Indians encountered in connection with surveys, telegraph lines, resource development, etc. The technique was to fly over the area dropping such gifts as pots, pans, mirrors, and pin-ups, or else have foot parties leave such offerings. One such campaign from 1943-46, at the behest of General George Marshall to explore Brazil’s natural resources, claimed a hundred lives; Rondon refused to allow weapons for self-defense. “This ‘crazy notion’ was termed suicidal . . .” wrote journalist Willard Price. “Criticism of General Rondon blazed in Rio, but he stood by his guns — or gunlessness. The Indians were to be won by kindness.” The effort succeeded when the Chavantes agreed to a treaty in 1946.

But in 1968 half the personnel of the IPS were themselves implicated in “twenty years of shame,” a long campaign of murder and sadism to terrorize Indians away from Brazil’s advancing frontiers. The 700-member IPS was disbanded and replaced. It was as if the Red Cross had been found operating death camps.

Ideas: David Riesman’s 1949 satire The Nylon War concerns a multi-billion-dollar U.S. effort to bomb the Russians with consumer goods, thereby causing them turmoil, economic dislocation, and increased demand for consumer rather than military production. Eventually Russia retaliates in kind: caviar, vodka, etc. It is a doleful reflection on these times that Riesman’s piece is satire, while nuclear war scenarios and MX shell games are not.

In a similar vein was Philip Roth’s caustic “Modest Proposal,” quoted above. The sarcasm was thick; as Roth points out, we would have to run the risk that an innocent child might be killed if he were crushed under a bag of rice.

An American army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Channon, offers a remarkable concept he calls “The First Earth Battalion” or “The Natural Guard.” More in the nature of prophecy than reality, his forthcoming book The First Earth Battalion advances themes similar to ones in this article. He mentions a “rescue company”/“pioneer company” for space, eco, and urban environments; and a “counterforce company” to engage in “combat of the collective conscience” aimed at world opinion, with video-oriented humane tactics. Thus, I list the First Earth Battalion under Friendly Persuasion, though it could cover the gamut of missions we are discussing. Channon hopes to promote the First Earth Battalion into actual existence (see bibliography).

Being a dreamer myself, I salute the attempt.

Another recent beginning is one called “Peace Brigades International” (PBI). In September 1981, eleven activists met at Grindstone Island, Ontario, and formed PBI to “undertake nonpartisan missions which may include peacemaking initiatives, peacekeeping under a discipline of nonviolence, and humanitarian service” (e.g., in Central America). This too I consider a species of Friendly Persuasion. Efforts such as PBI may aspire to Police Action or Buffer Action; as yet they are far too small for that. UN peacekeepers have much better logistics. The hope is that nongovernmental Peace Brigades might help in ways or places where the UN cannot. (Interested readers may contact Charles Walker, PBI Coordinator, P.O. Box 199, Cheyney, PA 19319.)

My emphasis tends to be on large-scale unarmed services, but that is not to disparage smaller vehicles. Historically, a single Friendly Persuader, such as Mohandas Gandhi, or Raoul Wallenberg, or
Folke Bernadotte, has been the functional equivalent of several armored divisions. Abie Nathan of Israel has long been a one-man peace army; besides his relief flights to Biafra, he flew three illegal goodwill missions to Egypt a decade before Sadat’s trip, and he operated the Peace Ship radio station along the Middle East coast from 1972-81.

So, among other things, the Friendly Persuasion function of unarmed forces would be Rondon and Channon and Nathan writ large.

Last summer British and French Greenpeace members rode in motor-powered inflatable rafts alongside the Gem, a United Kingdom nuclear waste transport ship, to try to prevent the ship’s crew from dumping barrels of radioactive waste into the Atlantic.

"Only in a world moving towards disarmament could we use effectively what might be called the unarmed services of the United States ... [including] a nonviolent freedom force that could help activate the politically suppressed in countries like Paraguay, South Africa, Albania, etc."

-Arthur Waskow, Running Riot; 1970; Out of Print; Herder and Herder; p. 70; and Waskow, Toward the Unarmed Forces of the United States; 1965; Out of Print; Institute for Policy Studies, Washington; p. 8; composite quotation.

Definition: Aggressive and unconventional initiatives by irregular but disciplined unarmed forces waging a revolutionary and/or defensive struggle against a more powerful opponent.

Even violent guerilla warfare, however brutal and dirty, has its unviolent tactics. For instance, in South Vietnam, National Liberation Front cadres would infiltrate a movie theater, shut off the projector, lecture the crowd, sneak away; in Uruguay, Tupamaros would invade households to warn families about malefaction by fathers or husbands; in El Salvador, guerrillas would halt and board a bus for some campaign oratory.

Another instance of guerrilla nonviolence is to be found in a firsthand narrative by Dickey Chappelle. She tells how Castro forces consistently released all their POWs unharmed, after importuning them to join the struggle and promising them they would be returned again to the Red Cross unharmed even if recaptured a second or third time.

Precedents: Apart from anecdotes such as these, the subject of revolution and nonviolent revolution is too broad to limit to a few remarks about guerrilla tactics. The preeminent nonviolent liberation struggle is, of course, Gandhi’s 30-year campaign to free India. It does not quite fit the category of Guerrilla Action but cannot be ignored in any discussion of liberation movements.
On another front: In recent years, Greenpeace International and its intrepid mariners have hastened the French into giving up atmospheric nuclear tests, and have taken terrible risks to place their boats between the harpoon and the whale. Paul Watson’s extramilitant offshoot, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, pushed close to the dividing line of nonviolence when his Sea Shepherd rammed and sank a notorious pirate whaler. And on land, various ad hoc “alliances” of eco-commandos have nonviolently stormed nuclear reactors in different countries.

Ideas: George Lakey has written well on the general theme of nonviolent revolution, but military-style unarmed guerrilla action is not its mechanism. Ideas for that approach are rather scarce. One of the only such notions was Arthur Waskow’s recurrent proposal back in the 1960s that the U.S. should frankly announce its intention to aid indigenous forces in the overthrow of the South African government. Waskow was always imaginative, but he was careless about the firebreak between violent and nonviolent tactics; he suggested guerrilla infiltrators could be trained in both methods.19

I hardly suggest guerrilla action is the best way to embody nonviolent resistance; looser social forms seem more likely. For that matter, guerrilla violence is no magic bullet either. Sandino, Guevara, Mandela, the Huqs, the Afghans, the Tupamaros: all ruthlessly crushed, like so many others. Armed or unarm mét, a guerrilla must face many defeats over the long haul; victory can require more than one generation.

"From the logistical point of view rapid disarmament would not be difficult. A thousand planes each carrying one hundred trained inspectors (or disarmers) could distribute 100,000 of these men at all major centers in Russia and the United States within 24 hours. Using land and water transportation, almost any number of additional inspectors could reinforce these within a very short time. . . . Helicopters and paratroopers could be used to reach remote areas. Properly trained and equipped with blow torches, thermite and other tools, the disarmers could quickly incapacitate the military power of both sides. . . ." —Earl D. Osborn, “Disarmament within Weeks?”; War/Peace Report; April 1962; p. 12

Definition: The use of unarmed military units for law enforcement, peace observation, and peacekeeping duties, in situations beyond the control of local authority.
As used here, Police Action is a term which may either combine, or distinguish among, peace observation, peacekeeping, or peacemaking. The first, “Model I” in UN parlance, already denotes small groups of unarmed officers for truce supervision and the like. The second, “Model II” force-level operations, remains mired in Big Power politico-legal dispute, despite the sudden rebirth of the Middle East emergency UN troops. The third, peacemaking, or peacebuilding as it is also called, implies the political and social initiatives that must accompany peacekeeping, lest the blue helmet become disparaged for attempting to freeze an unstable or unjust status quo.

The theory and practice of peacekeeping has already attracted a group of scholars and professionals; their usage now generally means host-country-consent type of operations, and not Korea. As William Frye pointed out in one of the earliest studies, “It would be well to keep this distinction between a fighting force and a peace force clearly before world opinion and before governments.”20 I not only concur, but would go on to stress the distinction between an armed and an unarmed peace force. Except for “Model I” observer teams, eschewing arms is not yet a deliberate policy and strategy of UN peacekeeping. The weaponry of peacekeeping should at least be a matter of controversy, which it is not.

Although peacekeeping soldiers are lightly armed, they are under strong pressure to avoid the use of violence, and so they resort to forms of what one UN watcher called “limited nonviolence” instead. He said there is much unwritten experience in their restraint of violence, and even instances of UN soldiers being killed while refusing to shoot back. All this type of data should be collated and studied.

Precedents: Brigadier Michael Harbottle, a former chief of staff for the United Nations Force in Cyprus, tells of a small, unarmed 174-member multinational civilian police component of the UN Cyprus force, composed of Australians, Austrians, Danes, and Swedes:

On many occasions it was their efforts rather than those of the military that prevented minor incidents from escalating into something much more threatening and dangerous. They went about their duties unarmed, though in the case of most of them it was normal practice in their own countries to carry side-arms; the Cypriots noticed this and appreciated the adherence to the principle of peaceful intervention.21

There is also a scattering of anecdotal material from various UN operations in which lack of weapons (or refusal to fire them) was decisive in dangerous situations:

...two unarmed Gurkha officers..., each driving a jeep, blocked both ends of an entire Katanga column that had started off on an unauthorized trip, briskly read off the mercenary officer in charge and ordered the whole column to dismount. Cowed by this show of courage, the colur'n promptly did.22

The London police have long been famous for their customary lack of firearms. And now, since 1979, into the savage cities and subways of America have come the Guardian Angels: unofficial, unarmed, staunchly nonviolent. Already one has been killed on duty. But founder Curtis Sliwa says they must turn the other cheek. So far, there are Guardian Angels in 33 cities; there are 700 in New York City, 1400 nationwide. These volunteer youth patrol in teams of eight, wear red berets and special T-shirts, and train in the martial arts and cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Skeptics have worried about the danger of vigilantism, but to date, the Angels have earned widespread respect for their dedication and self-discipline. Interested readers may contact Alliance of Guardian Angels, Inc., c/o Fran White, 982 East 89 Street, Brooklyn, NY 11236.23

Ideas: Note that I am also distinguishing Police Action from Buffer Action in the next section, which would also be a type of peacekeeping amidst incipient or severe hostilities. Thus I am underscoring the somewhat more restricted, discriminate, or person-to-person connotation of police and military/police action. But there is overlap, and the best, most explicit proposal for an unarmed UN peace force (by Narayan and de Madariaga) is cited below under Buffer Action, though it could be here as well.

One of the most unique ideas is that quoted earlier from Earl D. Osborn, the arms manufacturer and founder of the Institute for World Order. I would
dub his proposal the I.D.I.D., for “Instant Disarmament Inspection-Demolition Corps.” Osborn raised the concept of “sudden disarmament” in contradistinction to the long precarious phasing-out envisaged by most plans for arms control or disarmament. If there were in fact a negotiated agreement for “sudden disarmament” — which might take some time to negotiate — ruining the strategic weapons could be done within days, while scrapping and salvaging could take place at leisure. “A sledge hammer, a blow torch or a small grenade applied at the right spot would incapacitate nearly any military weapon.”

The I.D.I.D. would be airlifted to all the relevant sites simultaneously in all the major nations, fan out, and disable the ordnance; small detachments would remain permanently thereafter. This would be army-scale police action, unarmed except for the tools of its trade, which are not antipersonnel weapons.

Among many proposals over the years for some type of international police force (most of them armed), I will cite just Arthur Waskow’s model for a triplex peace police, written up in 1963. This too is not entirely nonviolent except at lower levels; but the plan had a number of sophisticated design features. There would be three police bodies (for disarmament, borders, and special situations), each controlled by separate councils, in turn responsive to world court orders, while the court would be acting on data turned up by an inspectorate, a fourth police body, unarmed. The force level authorized for any of the three peace police would be according to a preset, time-limited, aye-vote ratio in their respective controlling councils. For instance, disarmament treaty violations would be blamed on low-level individuals (such as a factory manager): disarmament police would serve court orders on him to cease and desist, not his government. So far the action would be small and unarmed; but with greater council consensus in the face of a persistent violation, greater increments of police units and weaponry would be authorized. As before, I dissent at the weapons phase.

The armed British “peacekeeping” presence in Ulster is all too familiar a quagmire. Their violent or repressive operations have earned the enmity of the belligerents and war weariness in the British public. Yet in May 1971, a British soldier in Belfast, Sergeant Michael Willets, 27, father of two, died after throwing himself on a terrorist bomb, and saved four civilian bystanders. It is this type of bravery I would point toward in suggesting that his example, and many others, be built upon, so that the very strength and effectiveness of UN or other police action and peacekeeping is precisely due to its use of “naked” force.
"... the presence of a body of regular world guards or peace guards, intervening with no weapons whatsoever between two forces combatting or about to combat, might have considerable effect. As an example, if a few thousand of such world guards had been parachuted into Budapest during the five or six days Hungary was free, the outcome of that struggle might have been quite different."

-Salvador de Madariaga and Jayaprakash Narayan, "Blueprint for a World Commonwealth" (see bibliography).

Definition: The deployment of unarmed military force between belligerents before, during, or after active hostilities.

If we can conjure up an unarmed military service of some tens of thousands of otherwise well-equipped regulars who could truly fulfill the Strategic Air Command slogan, "Peace Is Our Profession," then their foremost function might be Buffer Action. This would seem the most natural, the most inherent mission of all for a nonviolent military instrument whose purpose is to prevent or extinguish warlike hostilities, wherever they may arise. The concept is so obvious that it has indeed cropped up a number of times since 1931, but only in the most offhand or rudimentary manner. Not even pacifists have done more than peck at the periphery of the idea.

Precedents: The principle of buffer action has been illustrated ad hoc in a number of different situations:

1. In Cyprus and Kashmir UN observers have driven their jeeps right into the line of firefight to quench them, though superiors regarded such actions as overzealous.

2. In September 1962, the bodily interposition—between armed combatants—of some thousands of unarmed civilians acting spontaneously helped to cut short a five-day civil war among Algerian revolutionaries. Two forces had squared off for a pitched battle at the town of Boghari, south of Algiers. However, thousands of civilians filled the streets, forcing the commanders to order a cease-fire, and prevailing upon both sides to fraternize. Elsewhere, women lay at various points along Highway 14 to halt advancing armored columns, and 20,000 union members demonstrated in Algiers denouncing both sides and threatening a general strike in case of civil war. A political settlement was hastily arranged in the wake of these pressures.

3. William Hinton's Hundred Day War (see bibliography), is a detailed case history of one of the most noteworthy applications of mass nonviolent action since Gandhi's heyday. In July 1968, in Maoist China at the height of the Cultural Revolution, a few hundred fanatical Red Guards in two hostile factions were barricaded at Tsinghua University and battling each other with spears, grenades, and machine guns. Due to the prevailing chaos, the central authorities could not attack their own ultra-Maoist Red Guard heroes, no matter how misguided. So, led by army officers, 30,000 unarmed workers were organized to intervene between the combatants, and "use reason, not violence" no matter what. There ensued a 24-hour muddy, bloody ordeal in which over 700 workers were seriously injured and five killed—but with no retaliation against the Red Guard crazies, who were finally talked into a truce.

Ideas: The classic proposal for an unarmed buffer action force was advanced by Salvador de Madariaga and Jayaprakash Narayan in 1960, originally in the form of a letter to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold. Though published in several obscure sources, it has lain remarkably unnoticed since that time. The text began with an analysis of the political difficulties hampering UN use of armed force, and continued:

It follows that an international police should be unarmed. The presence of a body of regular World Guards or Peace Guards, intervening with no weapons whatsoever between two forces combatting or about to combat, might have considerable effect. They would not be there as a fanciful improvisation, but as the positive and practical application of a previously negotiated and ratified Additional Charter binding all United Nations members. This Charter should ensure:

1. Inviolability of the World Guards;
2. Their right to go anywhere at any time from the day they are given an assignment by the United Nations;
3. Their right to go and intervene in any conflict of any nature when asked by only one of the parties thereto or by third parties or the Secretary General.

The World Guards would be parachutists. They should be able to stop advancing armies by refusing to move from roads, railways, or airfields. They would be empowered to act in any capacity their chiefs might think adequate for the situation, though they would never use force. They should be endowed with a complete system for recording and transmitting facts, utilizing such equipment as television cameras and broadcasting material. Their uniform should be simple, clear, and appealing.

The setting up of this institution would no doubt be delicate; the Additional Charter would be difficult to negotiate. Who would launch the action of the Guards? The Secretary General should have permanent power to do so on his own initiative. It seems, at any rate, that in the negotiations the chief difficulty—fear and mistrust of power—would have been eliminated and the nations that would oppose the scheme would lose much face.

This kind of proposal deserves careful restudy and elaboration. (It is interesting to note how Lieutenant Colonel Channon's vision of video troops has hit upon one of the points raised by Madariaga/Narayan.)
A group of unarmed Czechs face off an invading Soviet tank in 1968. "At the beginning the secret (Czech) radios were angry," a Czech told the Illustrated London News. "They tried to whip up the feelings of the people. But now they realize that passive resistance is the best way, and they are asking people to remain calm. The best way to deal with the Russians is just to ignore them."

"This sight of marching, and probably uniformed, nonviolent brigades might give the citizens a sense of security. To the average citizen a nonviolent army of professional resistance fighters would personify the will to resist and give him the assurance that they would in any event do their job and not leave him in the lurch. The existence of a fearless nonviolent army, which would offer resistance to the last man, might act as a stronger warning to the potential invader than an invisible system of resistance cells."


Definition: The assignment of unarmed maneuver elements to close with and resist invasion troops to the death without killing them; and the assignment of other unarmed land, sea, air, and civilian forces to active duty in accordance with national strategy for guarding political, cultural, and territorial integrity, public security, and civil liberty.

We now consider the military institutions on which might fall the responsibility for protecting a nation or people without killing a would-be foe. Sad to say, the quality and quantity of ideas for unarmed defense forces is not proportionate to the paramount role that armed defense forces occupy in most people's minds.

There is a developing theory of civilian nonviolent resistance, which has received some official attention in Sweden, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. I am one of the exponents of this strategy, and Gene Sharp, its foremost analyst, uses the term civilian-based defense. However, by definition, such a posture tends to neglect a military aspect of unarmed defense. While not ignoring the Pentagon or the like entirely, some civilian resistance proponents imply that the military would wither away except for those officers tapped to organize the modalities of political and economic noncooperation with an invading foe or homegrown Napoleon. I have long urged that civilian resistance doctrine effort might be vested in military organizations.

As stated in Reserve Officer Training Corps manuals, "Basic Army doctrine emphasizes mobility,
flexibility, and staying power, so that the Army is maintained in a state of combat readiness for any war, anywhere, anytime, and in any manner.  

(Emphasis in the original.) Let our unarmed forces adhere to all of these precepts, taking as their cue "in any manner." In the real world, the mission of an Army division is "the destruction or control of enemy military forces and the seizure or domination of critical land areas, and their population and resources." Substituting the word dysfunction for destruction, we could try to visualize, as a general concept, nonviolent ground forces who are assigned to cause the systematic dysfunction of an invading army: by occupying chokepoints; fraternizing with and demoralizing the opposing soldiers whenever possible; guarding strategic or symbolic sites with their lives; drawing quislings; operating or stalling transportation; restoring or disrupting communications; bivouacking on runways, railroads, and highways; and so forth.

These are only specimen tactics, and do not really show a Big Picture; excluded here are air, sea, civilian, political, and diplomatic actions. I was simply trying to sketch a single aspect: main-force nonviolent combat (maneuver) units deployed as part of a grand strategy — the shock troops of a nation with strong preparedness for citizen defense against a wanton aggressor.

Preservation of national morale is the grand strategy of nonviolent common defense. If "nonviolent shock troops" do not reinforce this strategy, then other tactical modes must be developed, perhaps with more emphasis on Rescue Action or Guerrilla Action or Friendly Persuasion, or intelligence and communications. For example, the Danish Army was brushed aside within two hours when the Germans occupied Denmark in April 1940. But Danish Army Intelligence functioned throughout the war as an especially valuable source for the Allies.

Take another situation. A British-French plan to invade Sweden in March 1940 was squelched when the Swedes threatened to dismantle their railroads — which would literally have derailed that particular attempt under those particular conditions. The necessity did not arise. But let us speculate that in such a case, the Swedish Army could have been asked to rip out the rails and otherwise incapacitate the system. The point is that the tactics, whatever they are, must be adjusted to the general strategy and the particular circumstances.

Precedents: There are many improvisational examples of national nonviolent resistance to aggression — Gene Sharp covers a vast array of tactics and episodes in his work The Politics of Nonviolent Action. However, there are no cases of military nonviolent defense as set forth here. When Soviet forces invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, it was the civilians who improvised dozens of ways to harass, slow down, and confound the invaders — for a full eight months. The Czechoslovakian military was helpless. The spontaneous nonviolent defense effort was a wonder to behold, but could not last indefinitely without long range advance planning and preparation. Likewise in Poland since 1980, the nonviolent struggle of Solidarity achieved over 16 months of astonishing gains for freedom of speech and independent unions, before the martial law crackdown.

The Czechoslovak and Polish experiences confirm again and again how essential it is that a given nation, and its military, prepare the public in advance for long-term unarmed resistance to alien or domestic power seizure. The fast track to failure in nonviolent defense is to use tactics without strategy, strategy without principle, and principle without tenacity. The slow track to success is problematic but manifestly the opposite. Above all, it requires extensive training and preparation to preserve morale and national integrity.

Ideas: There are few direct proposals as such for unarmed defense troops, although the idea has been raised without much elaboration in a variety of contexts. Gandhi denounced the Munich sellout in 1938, and exhorted Czechoslovakia to nonviolently resist Hitler's takeover. But it was not until the dark hour of June 1940 that Gandhi first seriously proposed that India — if independent — should gear for nonviolent defense against (Japanese) invasion. On June 21, there was a basic policy split when the Congress Party executive committee rejected Gandhi's proposal for nonviolent defense against external invasion, and instead offered to help the British war effort, conditional on independence. Gandhi had said that the Congress "should train themselves to defend their country with a nonviolent army," but could not dissuade his colleagues from the first step on a road which led to India's atomic bomb.

Another military proponent of nonviolent defense is General París de Bollardier, a highly-decorated war hero, who was commander of the French paratroops in Indochina. (He resigned his commission in 1957 to protest French use of torture in Algeria.) He too has focused on a civilian approach to nonviolent defense, though he told an interviewer in 1972 that a military role must not be a contradiction, "if the army were trained in the technique of nonviolence."

One additional comment: Is it too much to expect that soldiers on active defense duty could give their lives, yet not kill? I argue that the military ethos of courage in facing death is not a function of killing people. To ask whether anyone could be expected to enlist in a front-line unarmed force is to ask why any soldiers anywhere go to war, volunteer for hazardous duty, or lay down their own lives that others may live.
Expeditionary Action

"... Let the British government call a constitutional conference in Salisbury, Rhodesia... [and] organize a commonwealth nonviolent expeditionary force. ... At a time judged to be appropriate, let the British delegates to the constitutional conference go into Rhodesia, covered only by the nonviolent troops of the commonwealth force."

-Ralph Bell, Rhodesia: Outline of a Nonviolent Strategy to Resolve the Crisis (see bibliography).

Definition: An unarmed military mission across national boundaries with a comparatively limited objective or duration; may involve extraterritorial rather than home-soil defense action, or defense of another nation on its own territory, or temporary intervention in restraint of flagrant injustice, oppression, invasion, or genocide.

Military nonintervention in the affairs of other states is widely honored in the breach, though the disrepute of expeditionary forces has been growing in recent years. There are few outspoken proposals for nonviolent (or any) intervention abroad, because most energy is absorbed by condemning imperialism - or camouflaging it. However, let us assume that a humane case can be made for exceptional circumstances into which nonviolent forces should be mandated with or without the consent of a particular state's rulers.

As smaller nations and former colonies and satellites come to cherish their sovereignty more and more, it seems arrogant and anachronistic to speak of expeditionary forces, even if they are nonviolent. But my intent is to see if any military function, including expeditionary action and invasion, could hypothetically be performed by nonviolent forces organized on a comparable scale.

If we grant a moral imperative, a political consensus, and perhaps a legal judgment that a particular state requires expeditionary action from outside to replace its political system or rulers or restrain them from unconscionable barbarism - can nonviolent forces do the job?

Ideas: There are no precedents, but the only explicit proposal for nonviolent expeditionary action (in fact, one of the very few cogent, detailed proposals for any kind of military-but-nonviolent force) was put forward by Ralph Bell in his 1966 pamphlet, Outline of a Nonviolent Strategy to Resolve the Rhodesian Crisis (see bibliography). An updated version with comments and rejoinders was published in 1968. Though it is now moot, the formulation is well worth studying.

Bell, a British clergyman, was addressing himself to leadership in church and state. British officials did look at his plan, and Arthur Bottomley, then Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, thought the proposal deserved consideration. But it was waived in favor of phony economic sanctions, and then years of British laxity while bloody war raged until Rhodesia legally became Zimbabwe in 1980.

Bell had a clear sense of the order of strategy: military action is subordinate to political objectives, and both are subordinate to moral (nonviolent) means. He suggested that Britain call a constitutional conference in Salisbury to create an unracial government and impose this solution with a Commonwealth Nonviolent Expeditionary Force. The Force would enter Rhodesia by conventional or airborne transit, openly announced, with persistence, and reinforcements as necessary. Casualties would have to be expected among these nonviolent commandos but not hoped for. The strategy would have included world publicity, constant pressure on the Smith regime to negotiate, and local civilian pressures spearheaded by the Force.

As for the Force itself, Bell stressed its military organization, need for discipline, willingness to accept casualties, pay and training commensurate with regular armed forces, moral prestige, and sufficient numbers for probable success.

The following key distinction which Bell makes re-echoes the central theme of this entire paper:

A member of the armed forces is called upon to do what he is told, to be killed and to kill to enforce a political solution. A member of a nonviolent force is also called upon to do what he is told, to be killed, but not to kill, to enforce a political solution.
Some of the 350,000 Moroccans who invaded the Spanish Sahara without weapons in 1975. The march generated a media sensation and enough diplomatic turmoil that Morocco's King Hassan could make a deal with Spain to exclude Algeria from annexing the Spanish Sahara.

"If you meet a Spanish civilian or a soldier, greet him and share your food with him. If he fires on you, arm yourself with your faith and your conviction and continue your march."

- King Hassan II of Morocco in a message to 350,000 civilians poised to invade Spanish Sahara:

Definition: An unarmed military campaign across national boundaries, with a comparatively long-range objective or duration, in restraint of flagrant injustice, oppression, invasion, or genocide.

The rationale for nonviolent invasion is similar to that for expeditionary action. The distinction, if not precise, is the greater length and scope of an invasion, compared to the other's temporary or limited purpose. When I first wrote this section in 1971, "invasion" was the wildest of these wild ideas. But lo, four years later, King Hassan II of Morocco, in an international tour de force, staged a mass nonviolent invasion of Spanish Sahara by 350,000 Moroccan civilians under army leadership.

Which is not to say I laud any of the particular circumstances; I was simply awed at another proof of Boulding's First Law: "Anything which exists is possible." Hassan proved that a nonviolent invasion is possible, and a useful tool in world politics.

Hassan's criteria were not mine, but what can you expect? Meanwhile, as I wrote earlier, a complete theory of unarmed forces must in principle allow for recourse to nonviolent mass attack outside their homeland(s) in extraordinary situations. Besides counterinvasion as a defense tactic, such cases would, in general, be those where proven genocide, slaughter, or oppression is being carried out in the face of all diplomatic efforts at remedy. The roll call of recent genocides is matched by the roll call of international permissiveness toward them: Armenians, Bengalis, Biafrans, Cambodians, Indonesians, Jews, Poles, Russians, Timorese, and Vietnamese are among the peoples "wasted" by the hundreds of thousands, even millions, just in this century — not to mention many other wars and slaughters.

Liberation of the death camps was only a tortuous byproduct of the Allied victory in World War II, and by no means the purpose of the fight against Hitler. Besides, the Gulag body count may have been worse. However, in a polity with sizeable nonviolent military forces at the ready, genocide itself — not some infringement of the "national interest" — would be casus belli for an invasion by the unarmed forces. Thus, if India did in fact have a very large Gandhi-style nonviolent army, an invasion of Bangladesh to halt the slaughter there might have been a live option much earlier in 1971. (Indeed, nonviolent organizers in
India were on the verge of launching large-scale incursions, but their plans were aborted by the outbreak of war in December.)

Obviously, as with war itself, nonviolent invasion does not occur in a vacuum but alongside other multiple pressures of diplomacy, politics, and publicity. Which was precisely the case in October 1975 when King Hassan was mobilizing his Green March invasion force.

Precedent: King Hassan’s invasion was mostly a theatrical maneuver to fake out the Algerians. Ostensibly the Moroccans were facing off the soon-to-depart Spanish troops, which as of November 1975 were still dug in against any premature seizure of their colony by Morocco or Mauritania or Algeria. Phosphate riches were the prize. From November 6 to November 8, the Green March poured across the border for a few token miles, outflanking Spanish minefields. It was then withdrawn by King Hassan, having generated a media sensation and enough diplomatic turmoil to hasten a deal with Spain which excluded Algeria. Morocco subsequently annexed all of Spanish Sahara in two stages, and ever since has been at war against an Algerian-backed independence movement.

So, while the context was rather sordid, the Green March itself was phenomenal. There is nothing to prevent the misuse of unarmed forces, except better-motivated ones.

Ideas: Once again, Ralph Bell is one of the only voices with the temerity to advocate aggressive military nonviolent action. Prior to his Rhodesia plan, he had also targeted South Africa in more general terms as the theater for a campaign against apartheid, to be augmented by a British “active nonviolent resistance force.” I classify that as an “invasion” on the assumption that South Africa would be a much more formidable effort than the Rhodesian campaign.

Until Hassan, this section had to be even more conjectural than the rest. But I had put invasion on the agenda because I agree with Waskow that in a disarming world there will be more struggle and conflict, not less. Given a substantial array of unarmed forces, a Just War need no longer be a moral Frankenstein but instead a legitimate, humane, and essential response by a larger community of nations when an entire people are in danger.

For decades the term peace army has bobbed along like a neglected cork in eddies of pacifist or idealist thinking, and there were even a few efforts to stick that cork into a volcano. Often the term is loosely applied to such vest-pocket symbols as work camps, peace demonstrations, or the Peace Corps. But seldom has there been an attempt to suggest how the main forces of any given military could perform their essential missions in their own right, “armed with courage alone.”

I am saying in effect, “These are some parameters and possibilities for unarmed services, and some of them might come in handy one day. It is not too early for any of us to speculate on an entire range of contingencies in which unarmed forces might be at least remotely conceivable. A lot more imagination and research would be helpful and is urgently needed.” Pure research and impossible dreams have their own justification, often more visible in retrospect.

Footnotes

1. Mao Tse-Tung, On the Protracted War; 1936; Foreign Languages Press, Peking; p. 56.
5. Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward (see bibliography).
13. Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall, Defense in the Nuclear Age (see bibliography); p. 124, 129, chapters 7 and 8.
14. Willard Price, Roving South: Rio Grande to Patagonia; 1948; Day, New York; p. 318; Malcolm Sessor, Brazil: Land without Limit; 1970; Barnes and Noble; Ernst Schwarz, Paths to Freedom through Nonviolence; 1952, 1959; Senever-Verlag, Vienna; p. 62; Allen Hunter, Courage in Both Hands; 1962; Ballantine.
15. Willard Price, Roving South (footnote 14); p. 318.


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"The Sahara Forest and Other Superordinate Goals" (with Scott Seymour); in Peace Research Reviews, Vol. 6 No. 3, Jan. 1975, p. 62.


**ALSO:**

Mohandas K. Gandhi, Nonviolence in Peace and War; 1942, 1949; 2 volumes; $80 postpaid from Garland Publishing, 136 Madison Avenue, 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10016; also see Thomas Merton, editor; Gandhi on Nonviolence (Selected Texts from Nonviolence in Peace and War); 1965; $3.95 postpaid from New Directions Publishing, W.W. Norton and Company, 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10110.

This is Gandhi's best anthology; it denounces "passive resistance" in favor of no-surrender "nonviolence of the strong." - Gene Keeyes
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